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Abstract
In a recent paper, Sen Cheng and Markus Werning argue that the class of episodic memories constitutes a 
natural kind. Endorsing the homeostatic property cluster view of natural kinds, they suggest that episodic 
memories can be characterized by a cluster of properties unified by an underlying neural mechanism for 
coding sequences of events. Here, I argue that Cheng and Werning’s proposal faces some significant, and 
potentially insurmountable, difficulties. Two are described as most prominent. First, the proposal fails to 
satisfy an important normative constraint on natural kind theorizing, not providing the requisite theo-
retical resources for arbitration between rival taxonomies of memory. Second, the proposal is in direct 
tension with a foundational principle of the HPC view: the rejection of essentialism. This has far-reaching 
consequences, which threaten to undermine the coherence of the proposal. 
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Introduction 
Is episodic memory a natural kind? Despite some impressive developments in the study 
of memory,1 this issue has received little philosophical attention.2 In a recent paper, Sen 
Cheng and Markus Werning set out to fill this gap.3 Putting forward a bold and in-
novative proposal, Cheng and Werning weave evidence from philosophy, psychology, 
and neuroscience to support an affirmative answer to the titular question. They anchor 
the proposal on Richard Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view of natural 
kinds.4 On this view, natural kinds are classes of entities that are likely to share relevant 
properties because of an underlying causal mechanism. Episodic memories, Cheng and 
Werning argue, comprise such a class. They are knowledge-like states characterized by 
mnemonic representations of personally experienced episodes, which afford subsequent 
simulation. The key feature of these representations is sequentiality, which is the dis-
tinguishing characteristic of both their content and their underlying neural realization. 
Crucially, the properties’ episodic memories share are clustered together in virtue of a 
neural mechanism for coding sequences of events (grouped in episodes). Episodic mem-
ory, consequently, should be considered a natural kind.5 In this brief discussion, I argue 
that Cheng and Werning’s proposal faces some significant, and potentially insurmount-
1 For an overview of recent developments in the philosophy of memory, see Sven Bernecker and Kourken 
Michaelian, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory (London: Routledge, 2017) and 
Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus, and Denis Perrin, eds., New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory 
(New York: Routledge, 2018). For recent developments in the psychology and neuroscience of memory, 
see Daniel L. Schacter, et al., “The Future of Memory: Remembering, Imagining, and the Brain,” Neuron 
76, no. 4 (2012): 677–94; and Scott D. Slotnick, Cambridge Neuroscience of Memory (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
2 It is perhaps not unfair to say that there is no other recent article that directly investigates whether 
episodic memory is a natural kind. Kourken Michaelian investigates the related question “is memory a 
natural kind?,” providing a negative answer. See Michaelian, “Is Memory a Natural Kind?” Memory Studies 
4, no. 2 (2010): 170–89; and Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
3 Sen Cheng and Markus Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory If It Is a Natural Kind?” Synthese 193, no. 
5 (2016): 1345–85.
4 See Richard Boyd, “Realism, Anti-foundationalism, and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds,” Philosophical 
Studies 61, no. 1 (1991): 140–43; and “Kinds, Complexity and Multiple Realization.” Philosophical Studies 
95 (1999): 67–98.
5 More specifically, Cheng and Werning express “optimism that episodic memory . . . is likely to be a 
natural kind” (“What Is Episodic Memory,” 1346). This may be interpreted as an important qualification 
of the major claim, but I doubt that this is the interpretation the authors favor. In any circumstance, here I 
investigate the reasons for Cheng and Werning’s optimism. 
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able, difficulties. After summarizing the authors’ case in section 2, I argue in section 3 
that the proposal fails to satisfy an important normative constraint on natural kind theo-
rizing. Namely, the authors don’t provide the requisite theoretical resources for settling 
disputes between rival taxonomies of memory. In section 4, I point to another important 
problem, arguing that Cheng and Werning’s approach is in direct tension with a foun-
dational principle of the HPC view: the rejection of essentialism. This has far-reaching 
consequences that threaten to undermine the coherence of the proposal. 
Episodic Memory as a Natural Kind
Cheng and Werning endorse Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster (HPC) view of natural 
kinds. On the HPC view, natural kinds are classes of entities that tend to share relevant 
properties by virtue of an underlying causal mechanism. Let’s introduce the major com-
ponents of the view by looking at Boyd’s classic case for biological species as natural 
kinds. First, a natural kind is a class of entities that tend to have certain properties in 
common. Thus, members of the same species share important morphological, behav-
ioral, and physiological features. Second, the regular co-occurrence of these properties 
in conspecifics is not an accident. There is a causal mechanism that explains their clus-
tering (namely: interbreeding).6 Boyd calls such mechanisms “homeostatic.” Third, the 
property cluster must figure in relevant causal generalizations. This is designed to ex-
clude clusters and mechanisms that are of little theoretical value. Finally, the class of 
entities must be maximal with regard to its explanatory potential. This means that no 
superset of the class should be able to provide the same explanatory leverage. Sticking 
with our example, the generalizations available for the class lions will not be available for 
the class lions and flying squirrels. In sum, a class C of entities is a natural kind if and only 
if there is a cluster of properties that (1) regularly co-occur (2) because of an underlying 
homeostatic mechanism, and (3) figure in relevant causal generalizations, such that (4) 
C is the maximal class whose members are likely to share these properties in virtue of 
the underlying mechanism.7 With this in mind, let’s turn to Cheng and Werning’s treat-
ment of episodic memory. To make the case that episodic memory is an HPC kind, they 
6 On the so-called ontic approach to explanation, what performs the explanation is an objective feature 
of the world (the mechanism), not a description of it. For details about the ontic approach, see Wesley 
C. Salmon, “Four decades of Scientific Explanation,” in Scientific Explanation (Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science), vol. 18 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) and Carl F. Craver, 
“The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation,” in Explanation in the Special Sciences: The Case of Biology 
and History, ed. Marie I. Kaiser et al. (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014), 27–52.
7 See Cheng and Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory,” 1358. Edouard Machery defines the notion of 
natural kind in an importantly similar way; see “Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind,” Philosophy of Science 
72, no. 3 (2005): 444–67. 
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have to demonstrate that the class of episodic memories is explanatorily maximal with 
regard to a relevant cluster of properties and a unifying homeostatic mechanism. This is 
precisely what they are out to deliver. Episodic memories, they argue, are characterized 
by representations of personally experienced episodes, which afford subsequent simula-
tion. Unlike semantic memories, they represent particular episodes from the subjects’ 
personal past.8 This is, of course, a familiar idea from the literature. The development 
of the idea, however, has been beset by much confusion, not the least of which pertains 
to the definition of an episode. Cheng and Werning are admirably clear in approaching 
this issue. They define an episode (E) as an ordered list of events (es), where the principle 
of ordering is temporal succession. For instance, the episode [Elena goes to a party] is 
a sequence of events [Elena leaves the house] < [Elena meets with her friend] < [Elena 
takes a cab] < [Elena enters the club], where “e1 < e2” signifies that the event e1 occurred 
before the event e2.9 The events that make up episodes are spatially and temporally ex-
tended particulars. Each event—as well as each episode, since an episode is a complex 
event—occupies a distinct region of space-time.10 
With the definition in hand, Cheng and Werning are ready to present the property clus-
ter that characterizes episodic memories. They do so in the form of a conceptual analysis, 
which they call “the Sequence Analysis of Episodic Memories.” Given that the details are 
of some relevance, the analysis is worth presenting in full:
A subject S has episodic memory with content E at a time t1 if and only if the following 
conditions are fulfilled: 
(S1)  E is an episode with E = < e
1
, ... , e
n
>. E is called the mnemonic content. 
(S2)  At some time t
1
, S compositionally
 
represents E as an episode of 
temporally succeeding events e
1
,...,e
n
. S’s representation of E at t
1 is called 
the mnemonic representation. 
(S3)  At a time t
0 < t1, S has a reliable experience of the temporally succeeding 
events e1* , ... , em*, which make up an episode E*
 = < e1*, ... , em* >. E* is 
8 This is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. See Cheng and Werning’s Sequence Analysis below for 
details. 
9 Note that this is the only criterion the authors include. According to this definition, the sequence < [I fell 
down the stairs in 1987]….[I had lunch last night] > constitutes an episode. The definition is minimal, and 
accordingly liberal, by design. For details, see Cheng and Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory,” 1351–52. 
10 This has some important consequences. For details, see Cheng and Werning, “What Is Episodic 
Memory,” 1353. 
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called the experiential base. 
(S4)  The episode E∗ occurs at or before t0 (factivity). 
(S5)  The mnemonic content E is ontologically grounded in the experiential base 
E* in the following sense of counterfactual dependence: Were E* to occur 
at or before t
0
, E would also occur at that time. 
(S6)  S’s representation with content E at t1 is causally grounded in S’s 
experience of E* through a reliable memory trace. 
(S7)  On the basis of its mnemonic representation with content E, S is capable 
of generating a temporally explicit simulation with content E at some time 
t
2 ≥ t1. The generated simulation is called a mnemonic simulation. (2016, 
1354)
As the authors are quick to note, the conditions (S1–S7) relate to the four major stages 
of memory processing: perception (S3, S4), encoding (S1), storage (S1, S2), and retrieval 
(S7). On the Sequence Analysis (SA), episodes, qua sequences of particular events, are 
the potential contents of mnemonic representations. Importantly, sequentiality is a key 
feature not only of the contents of episodic memories, but also of some vehicles.  As 
condition S7 specifies, the subject must be capable of generating a mnemonic simulation 
based on the memory content. In a mnemonic simulation, the temporal succession of 
events in the represented episode is itself represented by a temporal succession of repre-
sentational vehicles (read: neural processes).11 
Having specified the relevant property cluster, Cheng and Werning move to the next task: 
identifying the mechanism that maintains the homeostatic unity of episodic memories.12 
After arguing that the hippocampus is the “principal anatomical substrate” of episodic 
memory,13 they describe the putative hippocampal mechanism responsible for the 
11 See below for details. 
12 Actually, Cheng and Werning first discuss the explanatory maximality and minimality of the property 
cluster. For expository purposes, I have changed the order of presentation here. See section 4 for why this 
may have been necessary.
13 Support for this claim comes from data suggesting that hippocampal activity is necessary for encoding, 
storage and retrieval of episodic memories as well as from lack of evidence pertaining to the critical 
role of other brain regions (“What Is Episodic Memory,” 1364–71). Cheng and Werning argue that the 
hippocampus is part of a “cortico-hippocampal” network that performs important episodic memory 
functions. The hippocampus, however, plays a unique role in episodic memory, “endowing” the network 
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clustering. I can only present the briefest of sketches here, but the basic idea should be 
relatively easy to understand. Building on evidence from the neurosciences, the authors 
propose that populations of hippocampal cells firing in temporal sequence may represent 
the sequences of events within individual episodes (S1, S2). While episodes typically 
unfold over seconds, a compression mechanism known as “theta phase precession”14 
affords the generation of such representations at the timescale required for synaptic 
plasticity. The processes involved in the storage of sequences may thus provide a uniform 
causal mechanism for the grounding of memory representations in experiences (S3–S5). 
Moreover, there is evidence that in offline states, the relevant populations of neurons fire 
in sequences that correlate with the sequences in which they were active at the time of 
encoding. This neural replay may form the basis of temporally explicit simulations of 
previously experienced episodes (S6, S7).15 
Finally, Cheng and Werning need to establish that the class of episodic memories is 
maximal with regard to its inductive and explanatory potential. They take this to require 
showing that other kinds of memory do not satisfy the conditions specified in the 
Sequence Analysis.16 Accordingly, they go on to argue that the conditions are jointly 
sufficient to distinguish episodic from procedural and semantic memories.17 This affords 
them a relatively swift conclusion: since “no other memory or cognitive process” satisfies 
conditions S1–S7,18 it follows that the class individuated by the analysis is explanatory 
maximal. But they don’t stop here. Expanding the discussion, they aim to show that the 
with a specific computational capability (for details, see 1370–71). 
14 See John O’Keefe and Michael Recce, “Phase Relationship between Hippocampal Place Units and 
the EEG Theta Rhythm,” Hippocampus 3, no. 3 (1993): 317–30; and William E. Skaggs, et al., “Theta 
Phase Precession in Hippocampal Neuronal Populations and the Compression of Temporal Sequences,” 
Hippocampus 6, no. 2 (1996): 149–72. 
15 Cheng and Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory,” 1371–74.
16 See section 4 on why this is a bad interpretation of the maximality condition. 
17 Thus, procedural memories don’t have contents representable as sequences of events (S1), and they are 
not grounded in experiences of particular episodes (S5, S6). The focus of the discussion, however, is on the 
relationship between episodic and semantic memory. While conceding that “future work . . . is needed” ( 
1364) to fully elucidate this relationship, the authors are confident that the Sequence Analysis provides a 
good starting point. If we accept their argumentative approach, there may be a strong case for this claim. 
After all, mirroring the argument above, most semantic memories neither represent (S1) nor are grounded 
in (S5, S6) particular episodes.
18 Notice that the relationship to other cognitive processes is not investigated. This matters in the context 
of the neoempiricist revival associated with “mental time travel” literature. 
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class is also minimal ,19 which they interpret as implying that all of the conditions in the 
analysis are necessary. Accordingly, they go on to catalog the different ways in which 
violation of the conditions leads to deficiencies in episodic memory.20 For instance, the 
purported memory representation may be false, improperly grounded in a previous 
experience or it may not afford a temporally explicit simulation of the relevant episode. 
That all of these cases constitute deficiencies of episodic memory, the argument goes, 
demonstrates that the class of episodic memories is also minimal with regard to its 
inductive and explanatory potential.
This completes Cheng and Werning’s case. In sum, episodic memories exhibit properties 
that (1) regularly co-occur (2) because of a homeostatic neural mechanism. These 
properties (3) figure in important causal generalizations, and (4) the class of episodic 
memories is the maximal class of entities for which such generalizations are available. 
Admittedly, this is a very brief sketch of the account. But, there is enough here to anchor 
our discussion.
Episodic Memory: Tracking and Arbitration
The HPC view imposes different normative constraints on theorizing about natural kinds. 
Two are of central importance for our purposes; let’s call them tracking and arbitration. 
According to the tracking condition, the kinds recognized by scientific taxonomies 
must track relevant homeostatic mechanisms.21 On the HPC view, taxonomies are 
adequate only to the extent that they satisfy this condition .22 The arbitration condition 
is equally important. Since the appeal to mechanisms is meant to secure an objective 
foundation for taxonomies of kinds—that is, to tell us where the natural “joints” really 
are—the mechanistic structure of the world must be able to arbitrate between competing 
taxonomies.23 To keep with our example above, a great number of candidate taxonomies 
of species are discarded as inadequate by an appeal to the underlying mechanism of 
19 Tellingly, Cheng and Werning don’t mention explanatory minimality when they introduce the criteria 
for HPC kinds. See section 4 for why minimality, properly understood, is not a relevant criterion. 
20 Cheng and Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory,” 1359–63.
21 As such, homeostatic mechanisms seem to play the role essences play in traditional, essentialist 
accounts. For a defense of this claim, see Paul E. Griffiths, “Squaring the Circle: Natural Kinds with 
Historical Essences.” In Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. Robert A. Wilson (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press,1999).   
22 As Craver puts it, on the HPC view, “nature’s joints are located at the boundaries of mechanisms” 
(“Mechanisms and Natural Kinds,” Philosophical Psychology 22, no. 5 (2009): 575.  
23 See Craver, “Mechanisms and Natural Kinds,” for a detailed analysis of this constraint. 
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interbreeding. Tracking and arbitration are closely linked: scientific taxonomies appeal 
to mechanisms that explain the co-occurrence of properties in members of proposed 
kinds, where such explanations license the acceptance of these, and not other kinds (put 
forward by rival taxonomies), as natural. If episodic memory is to be a natural kind, 
then (a) there must be a homeostatic mechanism that episodic memory tracks, and (b) 
appeals to this mechanism should allow us to arbitrate between rival taxonomies (of 
memory). 
Does Cheng and Werning’s proposal satisfy both conditions? As should be obvious from 
the exposition, they consider the provision of a tracking account as their main explanatory 
burden. Accordingly, they describe a mechanism purported to explain the clustering of 
properties delineated by the Sequence Analysis. The proposal is undoubtedly speculative, 
but it is also refreshingly rich in empirical detail. So assume for now that the tracking 
condition is satisfied.24 What about arbitration? Here things are a bit more complicated. 
The first red flag comes from the way Cheng and Werning approach the validation of 
episodic memory as a natural kind. While the Sequence Analysis is supposed to be 
driven by experimental results from psychology and neuroscience,25 the property cluster 
is presented via analysis of the concept of episodic memory. Importantly, there is no 
appeal to mechanisms—homeostatic or otherwise—in the argument(s) for the necessity 
of conditions S1–S7. The argumentative strategy is essentially of the divide-and-conquer 
variety: first a philosophical analysis to specify the co-instantiating properties, then 
neuroscientific evidence for the existence of a relevant homeostatic mechanism.26 The 
consequences are significant. Since the authors don’t provide additional constraints on 
24 Whether this is the case is very much an empirical question. In this comment, I focus only on the large-
scale methodological issues pertaining to Cheng and Werning’s proposal. While there is much to be said 
about the empirical component of the proposal, I reserve that for a future occasion. 
25 Cheng and Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory,” 1345.
26 This is not a straw man. Cheng and Werning use the phrase “philosophical analysis” repeatedly, 
emphasizing that they are analyzing the concept of episodic memory (“What Is Episodic Memory,” 1353). 
Indeed, they list desiderata for the conceptual analysis. While one of the desiderata (D4) stipulates that 
the analysis should be “in accordance with our knowledge of neural mechanisms that underlie episodic 
memory” (1352), this is not reflected in the kinds of arguments Cheng and Werning provide for the 
necessity of conditions S1–S7. For example, the argument for the inclusion of the controversial condition 
S6 (the memory trace condition), as short as it is, does not involve a reference to a homeostatic mechanism. 
Rather it presents considerations of the traditional philosophical sort, even passing the buck back to C. 
B. Martin and Max Deutscher’s classic treatment (“Remembering,” Philosophical Review 75, no. 2 [1966]: 
161–96). The situation is similar with the other conditions. Given this, the characterization of the Sequence 
Analysis as “philosophical” is unlikely to be only a consequence of the authors’ exposition strategy.     
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the kinds of mechanisms that should be considered,27 there may be competing analyses 
(of the relevant psychological) kinds that satisfy the tracking condition. 
Consider the recent debate between simulationists and causal theorists of memory. Re-
garding simulation theories, episodic remembering is seen as a process of simulating 
past events where a causal connection to the remembered event is not necessary.28 More-
over, most simulationists consider the difference between episodic memory and episodic 
future thought—that is, the simulation of future episodes—to be a difference of degree 
and not of kind.29 Accordingly, simulationist analyses30 of the relevant kinds will tend to 
focus on properties clustered in virtue of mechanisms operative in different forms of epi-
sodic thought. Such analyses will typically drop the memory trace condition (S6) as well 
as conditions S4 and S6, grounding episodic representations in past experiences.31 Now, 
let’s assume we stick with the emphasis on sequences 32and consider only the property 
cluster S1–S3 and S7. Let’s call this the Simulationist Sequence Analysis (SSA). 
Is there a neural mechanism that explains the regular co-occurrence of these properties?33 
27 On the so-called “consensus view” of mechanisms in recent philosophy of science, see Carl F. Craver and 
James Tabery, “Mechanisms in Science,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 edition), 
edited by Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/science-mechanisms/. 
“Mechanist” philosophers have generally opted for a minimal characterization of mechanisms, describing 
them as sets of entities and activities organized in particular ways (e.g., causal, spatial, temporal) to produce 
specific phenomena. Given this minimal approach, isolating clusters of properties that track homeostatic 
mechanisms will not be particularly difficult. See below. 
28 See Michaelian, Mental Time Travel; and Michaelian and John Sutton, “Memory,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2017/entries/memory/.
29 In the terminology of Denis Perrin (2016), they are “continuists”; see Perrin, “Asymmetries in Subjective 
Time,” in Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel, ed. Kourken 
Michaelian, et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 39–61. Continuists may also hold that 
episodic counterfactual thought is not different in kind from episodic remembering.
30 See Michaelian (Mental Time Travel, ch. 6) for an example of a simulationist analysis of episodic memory.
31 Notice: here the goal is to isolate a property cluster characterizing a class of entities likely to constitute 
a natural kind. The cluster does not characterize episodic memory specifically. Accordingly, the temporal 
markers in conditions S3 and S7 will also be eliminated. This allows a continuist treatment of (say) episodic 
memory and episodic future thought.
32 This is not an unproblematic assumption. 
33 More specifically: is there a mechanism that explains the occurrence of these and only these properties? 
See below (as well as section 4).  
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The answer is surely yes. Indeed, Cheng’s (2013) very own CRISP theory of hippocampal 
function seems to describe such a mechanism. In CRISP, sequences of external stimuli 
are represented by sequences of neural activity in hippocampal area CA3. Importantly, 
unlike in rival theories, the input sequences are not stored in the hippocampus; rather, 
they are mapped onto intrinsic neural sequences in CA3.34 As Cheng emphasizes, this is 
a crucial feature of CRISP: it allows the theory to account for both replay of past sensory 
sequences and pre-play of future sensory sequences in offline neural activity.35 In es-
sence, the underlying mechanism makes possible the representation (and simulation) of 
past and future episodes.36 Described in such a way, the core hippocampal mechanism 
is one for coding sensory sequences, regardless of whether those are of past or future 
events. Thus, properties S1–S3 and S7 are regularly coinstantiated in virtue of a homeo-
static mechanism, but there is no feature of the mechanism that necessitates the inclu-
sion of further properties. Quite to the contrary, the class of entities picked out by the 
simulationist analysis is maximal with regard to its explanatory potential. If we include 
further properties —say: memory traces (S6) —we will sacrifice some important gener-
alizations pertaining to the representation of sensory sequences tout court.37 Now, im-
portantly, the rival analyses—SA and SSA—license different and incompatible answers 
to our main question: is episodic memory a natural kind? On Cheng and Werning’s SA, 
as we have seen, the answer is affirmative: episodic memory is split from other cogni-
tive kinds. On the SSA, the answer is negative: episodic memory is lumped together 
with episodic future thought.38 Both analyses, however, satisfy the tracking condition, 
34 For details, see Sen Cheng, “The CRISP Theory of Hippocampal Function in Episodic Memory,” Frontiers 
in Neural Circuits 7, no. 88 (2013): 5–10.
35 This is noted as a particular strength of the CRISP model. See Cheng, “CRISP Theory,” 8–10. 
36 Note: this follows (only) on the minimalist view Cheng and Werning endorse. Since they build their 
case for a homeostatic mechanism on similar kinds of evidence, the tentative conclusion is satisfactory for 
our purposes.  
37 Note: the point here is not that memory traces don’t exist. Indeed, there are good reasons—conceptual 
(Robins 2016) and empirical (Josselyn et al. 2015) —to think that they do (for conceptual reasons, see 
Sarah Robins, “Representing the Past: Memory Traces and the Causal Theory of Memory,” Philosophical 
Studies 173 [2016]: 2993–3013; for empirical reasons, see Sheena A. Josselyn, Stefan Köhler, and Paul 
W. Frankland, “Finding the Engram,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 16 [2015]: 521–34). The point is that 
there is nothing in the pinpointed mechanisms that necessitates the inclusion of memory traces (the 
hippocampal representations may play the role of traces, but they do so only in specific circumstances). 
38 Cheng and Werning may insist that episodic memory is still a natural kind, despite being a sub-kind 
of episodic thought. This may be the case, but the more general point holds: the description of this class 
of neural mechanisms does not necessitate the inclusion of further properties in the cluster. At the very 
least, then, there is an inevitable indeterminacy in the characterization of the kinds (see section 4 for 
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pinpointing mechanisms that maintain the homeostatic unity of the purported kinds. 
So, which taxonomy should we choose? Are there reasons to privilege one (description 
of a) homeostatic mechanism? What kinds of reasons are these? Cheng and Werning, 
unfortunately, don’t discuss these issues in any detail. Without satisfying answers, how-
ever, a simple appeal to mechanisms will not allow us to settle disputes between the rival 
taxonomies. 
This is only the tip of the iceberg. As Craver (2009) has pointed out, most (cognitive) 
phenomena can be described as clusters of co-occurring properties supported by causal 
mechanisms. These mechanisms will operate at different levels of organization and will 
participate in a variety of causal-mechanistic explanations. Absent further constraints 
on the kinds of mechanisms that should be considered, one would find homeostatic 
property clusters wherever one finds systematic correlations.39 And, given the array 
of explanatory purposes and projects, many of these will figure in important causal 
generalizations. This is particularly damning in the context of episodic memory, where 
proposed clusters are a dime a dozen. Not even leaving the letter A, we find proposals 
about the centrality of autonoetic consciousness,40 the importance of attribution41 in the 
experience of remembering, and the crucial role autobiographical42 knowledge plays in 
episodic memory. Most of these proposals are accompanied by taxonomies that satisfy the 
further treatment of this important issue). Moreover, there are many competing taxonomies that provide 
incompatible verdicts on our main question (see below). 
39 This is a direct consequence of the minimalist conception of mechanisms sketched above. If any set of 
entities and activities, organized somehow to ‘produce’ a phenomenon, counts as a mechanism, then there 
will be many different property clusters that track homeostatic mechanisms. Moreover, a given cluster will 
be maintained by a number of such mechanisms. In Craver’s example, the generation of an action potential 
can be described as a cluster of co-occurring properties that are homeostatically maintained by a variety 
of mechanisms: genetic (regulatory), proximal (input from presynaptic cells), developmental, and distal 
evolutionary ones. This problem generalizes (“Mechanisms of Natural Kinds,” 582–83). Consequently, 
absent some further constraints on the kinds of mechanisms that should be considered, it will be relatively 
easy to satisfy the tracking condition.      
40 See Endel Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness,” Canadian Psychology 26, no. 1 (1985): 1–26; and 
Stanley B. Klein, “What Memory Is,” WIREs Cognitive Science 6, no. 1 (2015): 1–38.
41 See Larry L. Jacoby, Colleen M. Kelly, and June Dwyan, “Memory Attributions,” in Varieties of Memory 
and Consciousness: Essays in Honour of Endel Tulving, edited by Henry L. Roediger and Fergus I. M. Craik 
(London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1989), 391–422; and Marcia K. Johnson, Shanin Hashtroudi, and D. Stephen 
Lindsay, “Source Monitoring,” Psychological Bulletin 114, no. 1 (1993): 3–28.
42 See Martin A. Conway, “Memory and the Self,” Journal of Memory and Language 53, no. 4 (2005): 
594–628.
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tracking condition,43 pinpointing mechanisms responsible for maintaining the specified 
property clusters. Yet, they issue incompatible verdicts on Cheng and Werning’s titular 
question: “what is episodic memory if it is a natural kind?” These are cases of tracking 
without arbitration. 
If mechanisms should help us arbitrate between rival proposals—providing an objec-
tive foundation for a taxonomy of kinds—then the privileging of specific mechanisms 
as relevant for episodic memory needs to be independently justified. For reasons only 
sketched in the previous paragraph, however, it is not clear how/where such indepen-
dent justification can be acquired.44 Consequently, Cheng and Werning opt for the easier 
route: they settle on an analysis of episodic memory in accordance with the available 
knowledge,45 and then they provide evidence that the tracking condition has been sat-
isfied. This strategy comes dangerously close to inverting the required direction of ex-
planation. Given that the arbitration condition is not fulfilled, it is not the presence of 
an underlying mechanism that tells us where the natural “joint” of episodic memory 
is. Rather, the “joint” is located via a traditional conceptual analysis, which is then sup-
ported by an appeal to a specific class of neural mechanisms.46 As a result, the putative 
unity of the proposed property cluster is as much conceptual as it is causal.  
Maximality, Minimality and Empiricist Holdovers
The issues raised in the previous section point to a deeper problem with Cheng and 
Werning’s proposal. Let’s explore it by zooming in on some of the details of the HPC 
view. Importantly, Boyd advanced the view as an alternative to essentialism about natu-
ral kinds. Essentialists hold that natural kinds are characterized by the possession of a set 
of properties which all and only members of the kind share: the kind’s essence. As Cheng 
43 This claim, admittedly, issues a promissory note. But given the considerations sketched above, there is a 
particularly strong case to be made for it.
44 For some interesting ideas, see Michael L. Anderson, “Mining the Brain for a New Taxonomy of Mind,” 
Philosophy Compass 10, no. 1 (2015): 68–77; and Felipe De Brigard, “Cognitive Systems and the Changing 
Brain,” Philosophical Explorations 20, no. 2 (2017): 224–41.
45 Desideratum 4 is therefore satisfied. The important point here, however, is that compatibility, or 
accordance, with our knowledge of neural mechanisms is not a sufficiently strong condition.  
46 A related worry pertains to the fact that Cheng and Werning describe one possible class of neural 
mechanisms for coding sequences. While the evidence they provide for their model is impressive, there 
are a number of models/descriptions of sequence-coding mechanisms in the literature. However, I am 
bracketing this issue here.  
Andonovski | Is Episodic Memory a Natural Kind?
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1609  | 13
and Werning recognize,47 however, kinds investigated by the special sciences are unlikely 
to possess essences. Given the natural variability of biological and psychological individ-
uals, instances of these kinds will only tend to share relevant properties.48 The number of 
co-occurring properties, and potentially the mechanisms that maintain the homeostatic 
unity, will typically vary across instances. The HPC view was designed specifically to 
deal with such variability, preserving the idea that there are natural kinds in the domains 
investigated by the special sciences. Accordingly, HPC kind concepts are not defined 
by a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Rather, they have a prototype structure, 
reflecting the inevitable messiness of the biological world. As Boyd  emphasizes, any 
further refinement of the kinds will artificially obscure the inevitable indeterminacy in 
the extension of special science kind terms. The pursuit for such “refinement”—that is, 
for necessary and sufficient conditions—is diagnosed as a “holdover from traditional 
empiricist conceptions of linguistic precision which must be abandoned.”49 
Set upon this backdrop, Cheng and Werning’s reliance on the Sequence Analysis is par-
ticularly puzzling.50 As we have seen, to establish that the class of episodic memories is 
explanatorily minimal and maximal, the authors attempt to show that the properties 
delineated in the analysis are individually necessary and jointly sufficient. Thus, any vio-
lation of conditions S1–S7 would lead to a deficiency of episodic memory (minimality) 
and only episodic memories satisfy all conditions (maximality). This approach sacrifices 
much of the theoretical nuance of the HPC view. Consider the treatment of explanatory 
minimality. “A mnemonic representation,” the authors argue, “fails to be proper episodic 
memory if one or more of the conditions (S1)–(S7) is violated, even in cases where the 
content of the mnemonic representation is veridical.”51 This kind of stringency may be 
appropriate in the delineation of conceptual clusters, but it seems decidedly out of place 
when we are dealing with mechanistically unified causal clusters. Again, this is the bread 
and butter of Boyd’s view: given the variability and multiple realizability of psychologi-
cal kinds, episodic memories—considered as HPC kinds—will share relevant properties 
only imperfectly. And in some circumstances, there may simply be no fact of the matter 
47 Cheng and Werning, “What Is Episodic Memory,” 1358.
48 See Boyd, “Realism,” on why instances of a kind will share properties only imperfectly.  
49 Boyd, “Realism,” 142.
50 Cheng and Werning recognize that essentialism is too restrictive to admit for natural kinds in the 
special sciences (“What Is Episodic Memory,” 1358), yet on the very next page venture on to a pursuit for 
necessary and sufficient conditions for episodic memory (1359). This is perplexing. 
51 2016, 1360f.
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whether a particular mental state is an episodic memory.52 Note: the point here is not 
that episodic memories don’t have essences. Cheng and Werning, after all, may be right 
that all and only proper episodic memories possess a specific set of properties. The point 
is rather that an appeal to homeostatic mechanisms is unlikely to anchor such essenc-
es.53 The search for necessary and sufficient conditions for episodic memory, then, is in 
a direct tension with a foundational principle of the HPC view. What about explanatory 
minimality and maximality, however? What role do these conditions play in the HPC 
theory? Pace Cheng and Werning, the maximality condition isn’t there to necessitate 
the inclusion of a set of jointly sufficient conditions for membership in the kind. Its role, 
rather, is to ensure that the many subsets of the relevant kinds don’t end up being counted 
as natural kinds themselves. To go back to our example once again: the causally relevant 
properties that lions tend to share will also be shared by sleepy lions,54 and for the same 
reason: the underlying homeostatic mechanism. The maximality condition—stipulating 
that no superset of the class should have the same explanatory potential—acts as a safe-
guard, disqualifying sleepy lion as a candidate for natural kind-ness. From this perspec-
tive, it is easy to see why explanatory minimality, properly understood, is not a relevant 
condition of the HPC view. Given any natural kind class, there will be many subsets of 
the class with the same explanatory potential. Sleepy lions, thirsty lions, and lions that 
live in San Diego share the properties that figure in inductively relevant generalizations. 
This does not disqualify lion as natural kind candidate.
In our case, likewise, it matters only if the class of episodic memories is explanatorily maxi-
52 As Boyd (1999, pp.143-144) clarifies, imperfect homeostasis is nomologically possible or actual. A thing 
may display some but not all of the relevant properties (i.e. the properties that co-occur in an important 
number of cases; similarly, some but not all of the relevant underlying homeostatic mechanisms may 
be present. In cases of imperfect homeostasis, the relative importance of the various properties and 
mechanisms - in determining whether a particular entity belongs to a kind - is decided in an a posteriori 
manner (i.e. by consulting the relevant theory for the domain). Importantly, there will be (many) cases of 
extensional indeterminacy, which are not resolvable, even with access to all the relevant facts and all the 
true theories. In these cases, no “rational considerations” will dictate whether or not a thing should be 
considered a member of a given kind (1999, p.144). For example, the necessary indeterminacy in extension 
of species terms is a consequence of Darwinian evolutionary theory: “speciation depends on the existence 
of populations which are intermediate between the parent species and the emerging one” (Boyd 1991, 
p.142). Attempts to resolve such indeterminacy  - by further ‘sharpening’ of the kind concepts - will only 
artificially obscure their natural “family resemblance” structure. Whether such extensional indeterminacy 
exists in the case of episodic memory is an open question.  
53 Some significant issues, specifically pertaining to the multiple realizability of psychological kinds, lurk 
in the background here. A full exploration of these issues is beyond the scope of this essay. In any case, the 
main point—that psychological kinds are unlikely to possess essences—is granted by Cheng and Werning.
54 Excluding being sleepy.
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mal. If it is, then there must not be a superset with the same explanatory potential, the 
members of which are likely to share the same causally relevant properties. Whether such 
a superset exists, as Cheng and Werning note, is a matter of some controversy, with declara-
tive memory and mental time travel typically put forward as prime candidates.55 This issue, 
however, is inextricably linked to the provision of a relevant property cluster. Accordingly, 
investigations of maximality will inherit the problems sketched in the previous section. 
Thus, if there are competing analyses that (a) satisfy the tracking condition, and (b) sub-
serve different explanatory projects, there will also typically be incompatible, yet equally 
satisfying, verdicts on maximality. We saw this in the context of the debate between causal 
and simulation theories. If we consider pastness and the presence of memory traces to be 
key properties of episodic memories, then it is unlikely that a superset kind like mental time 
travel will carry the same explanatory potential. In contrast, if we opt for a less restrictive 
analysis, then the case for mental time travel as a natural kind will be much stronger. This 
problem is only exacerbated by the prototype structure of HPC kind concepts. In some 
cases, it will be exceptionally difficult (impossible?) to determine whether two classes have 
the same explanatory potential.56 There are some deeper issues lurking in the background 
here. Given the natural variability and the purported multiple realizability of psychologi-
cal kinds, there is a reasonably strong case to be made that HPC taxonomies cannot in 
principle satisfy the arbitration condition.57 While this issue lies beyond the scope of this 
comment, it is worth mentioning that memory researchers have been implicitly dealing 
with it for quite some time. Thus, the behavioral, mechanistic, and neural variability of 
memory kinds was one of the primary reasons for adopting the memory systems approach, 
which has dominated the recent discussion. As Schacter and Tulving point out in their 
seminal contribution, a memory system will typically comprise a variety of neural and cog-
nitive mechanisms, working together and in accordance with some important principles. 
And, while episodic memories may have a number of characteristic properties,58 it would 
be very surprising if these were clustered together by the operation of one class of causal 
55 See Michaelian, Mental Time Travel.
56 This may entail that the notion of “same explanatory potential” is fundamentally problematic. I postpone 
the discussion of this issue to a future occasion. 
57 See Craver, “Mechanisms and Natural Kinds.”
58 Endel Tulving lists 28 important features of the episodic memory system, pertaining to the type of 
information/content, the character of computational operations, and the relevant applications (Elements 
of Episodic Memory [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983]). Cheng and Werning (“What Is Episodic 
Memory,” 1349) characterize Tulving’s approach as “descriptive.” While Tulving was providing a description 
of the features, however, this was a necessary component in the explanatory project of identifying and 
distinguishing the episodic memory system from other cognitive systems. 
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mechanism, as in Cheng and Werning’s proposal. This is why identifying a memory system 
requires, at the very least, the specification of a large number of class-inclusion operations, 
distinguishing properties at multiple levels of organization as well as convergent dissocia-
tions from other memory systems.59 This approach may not appease the major worries, but 
it is an important step towards satisfying the arbitration condition. 
Conclusion
Cheng and Werning describe their project as “inherently interdisciplinary,” navigating 
between the twin cliffs of philosophical analysis and neuroscientific description. 
Genuine interdisciplinarity, however, requires more than paying attention to evidence 
from a variety of sources. It also obliges us to jettison the argumentative divide-and-
conquer strategy, which often relegates either philosophy or neuroscience to the 
position of a Lockean “under-laborer.” To properly navigate between the cliffs, we have 
to “mine the brain” for new taxonomies of the mind,60 but also work together to explore 
both the terms of engagement and the conditions for success. When does an appeal 
to neural mechanisms or systems license the acceptance or revision of psychological 
categories? What role does philosophical analysis play in the construction of cognitive 
ontologies?61 What is the relationship between conceptual and causal property clusters? 
These questions are highly complex and the answers will likely elude us for some time. 
To advance our understanding of mind-brain relationships, however, we must directly 
engage with them. Cheng and Werning’s proposal, while innovative and empirically 
detailed, ultimately fails to do so. Anchored on the pursuit of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for episodic memory, it doesn’t provide the requisite theoretical resources for 
arbitration between rival cognitive taxonomies.  
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